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The Ground-Zero Theory of Evidence
by
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE*
When the subject of "truth and its rivals" is raised, I suspect that
most of us think about an unattainable but ideal conception of truth
and the principles that regularly conflict with the proof of truth in
American courts of law, such as fairness, efficiency, and the promo-
tion of worthwhile social relationships. Typically, this inquiry starts
with an ideal conception of truth and asks whether the methods of
proof in American evidence law have any chance of attaining this
idealized truth. I propose, however, to recast the inquiry. I will show
that American evidence law already embodies a conception of truth
which is strong and coherent, but flawed. Law is, of course, a princi-
pled field, but it is also a pragmatic one. Law lives not only in the
world of philosophy, but also in the world of practice. In this Article,
I will emphasize the practice over the principles to show from the
ground up, as it were, just what conception of truth American evi-
dence law acts upon. I will be asking: What is truth as seen from the
perspective of American evidence law, and what rival conceptions of
truth might be used to disrupt our standard view?
What I propose to do here might be called the ethnography of
doctrine. Just as anthropologists study foreign (to them) cultures un-
til these cultures gradually become familiar, routine and explainable
to others, an ethnographer of legal doctrine examines the rules and
structures of legal practice as if they were foreign in order to see what
visions of social life and values they contain The ethnographer of
legal discourse first wonders why the things that seem so obvious to
native informants (in this case, lawyers and judges) are the way they
are. By then working her way into the rules and seeing the world
through these local understandings (though always remembering that
she could and once did see in other ways), the doctrinal ethnographer
comes to understand legal rules as regulating a particular construc-
tion of social reality, one that normalizes itself by presenting itself as
inevitable. Reasonable alternatives to the rules, within any social
practice, are driven out or abnormalized. What the ethnographer can
see, however, is the way in which these exclusionary practices have
* Professor of Law, Political Science and Sociology at the University of Pennsylva-
nia and Co-Director of the Program in Gender and Culture of Central European Univer-
sity, Budapest.
1. I first started elaborating this perspective in my book KIM LANE SCHEPPELE,
LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW (1988).
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constituted the rules that remain as the only sensible rules.
I will argue that American evidence law embodies a "ground-
zero" theory of evidence. This theory implicitly adopts a conception
of truth that takes for granted a strong relationship between informa-
tional accuracy and relevance on the one hand, and the distribution
of knowledge over time and space on the other. In other words, the
American law of evidence deems a piece of information to be more
likely to be true if it was produced close to the events that are in
question in the lawsuit, the "ground zero" of the metaphor. For ex-
ample, if the lawsuit is about a car accident, the facts generated from
the time and place where the cars collided (eyewitnesses to the acci-
dent, the twisted metal wreckage of the particular cars in question,
the weather conditions at that precise moment) are considered to be
more accurate and useful (that is, relevant and true) than the facts
from any other time and space (friends who heard about the accident
later from one of the drivers, other intact cars of the same sort that
were not involved in that particular accident, the weather in the week
preceding the crash). The point of American evidence law is to en-
able the reproduction of the ground-zero moment and its aftermath
to assess what truly happened.
The ground-zero metaphor is military. Ground zero is the point
where the bomb hits, and, in nuclear destruction models, levels of
devastation are measured out from this zero point. To understand
the bomb and its effects, one first goes to ground zero and then traces
the patterns from that ground-zero point to understand "what hap-
pened." American courts of law work similarly. In the evidence law
context, the ground-zero metaphor refers to the legally relevant
events-the car crash, the breached contract, the failed merger, the
insider trade, the bank robbery, the rape-which, like the place
where the bomb was dropped, have a central physical and temporal
point at which the damage is thought to be greatest, Like the effects
of the bomb, the effects of the legally relevant events radiate out-
ward. Thus, ground zero is the moment when "the trouble" occurred,
and the law of evidence strives to admit facts that were generated as
close in time and space as possible to the moment when this trouble
happened.
Looking for facts at ground zero and its immediate surroundings
makes sense if you believe that knowledge of the events in question is
concentrated at ground zero. Under this belief, by looking at ground
zero you are most likely to find the truth of the matter, if such a truth
exists. American evidence law embodies just this sort of theory be-
cause, as I will show, the rules of evidence privilege the information
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that comes from the ground-zero location.2 This model imagines that
ground zero is not just the central location of damage, but also that it
is the central point in the distribution of knowledge. The closer a
piece of information is to ground zero (for example, if it came from
witnesses in the time and place of the event, from statements made at
the time by the parties, from the physical objects retrieved from the
scene), the more likely an American court of law is to admit it as evi-
dence. The farther away from ground zero the knowledge comes
(from hearsay, from reconstructions, from comparison with other
similar occurrences, from rethinkings of the events after the fact), the
less likely the evidence is to be admitted. The reliability and rele-
vance of knowledge, like the extent and scope of damage, are thought
to lessen with distance in time and space from the original event.
And reliable and relevant knowledge is the essential ingredient in the
determination of truth.
But this conception of truth-so commonsensical at first
glance-is also deeply problematic in many ways. The ground-zero
theory, for instance, has the effect of elevating what is distinctive and
particular about the individual event in question over and above what
is a larger social pattern, which might be a more adequate causal ac-
count. If, for example, you see the particular car accident as the re-
sult of an individual driver's error or the uniquely bad weather on the
day in question, you miss the role of broader forces that provide a
context for these local causes. A public policy that encourages cars
over mass transportation has a certain causal effect in creating a par-
ticular accident rate, and hence might be seen as responsible for the
individual accident. But this would require a reconsideration of rele-
vance rules, which would require that the ground-zero theory of evi-
dence be thrown out or substantially modified. The focus on the
ground-zero version of events has a tendency to blur or completely
eliminate those effects precisely because they operate equally in all
cases of a similar sort and therefore there is nothing distinctive in the
particular case to link the general cause with the particular effect.
For American evidence law, the focus on the particular restricts the
use of evidence with such remote causal connection because of
problems about relevance, which is a sort of filter through which facts
are passed before truth can be determined.'
But even if you assume that background causes or whole social
practices cannot bear the weight of legal responsibility in individual
cases as a matter of policy, the ground-zero theory of evidence is still
2. See infra Part II.
3. For a discussion of the way that tort doctrine emphasizes the particular over the
general, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Law Without Accidents, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A
CHANGING SOCIETY 267,271-74 (James S. Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu eds., 1991).
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problematic when you want only to figure out what happened at the
moment of trouble using completely conventional accounts of legal
relevance. People who are seriously injured by the events in question
in a lawsuit often respond to these traumatic events by repressing, al-
tering, dissociating or otherwise failing to reproduce in their memo-
ries exactly what happened at the time. They cannot help it. Theo-
ries of trauma within different schools of psychoanalysis show that
the ground-zero moment is exactly when one would expect to fail to
find adequate knowledge about what occurred at the time.4 If you
ask people "what happened" right at the moment of trouble, those
most injured by the events in question will often not be able to say, or
to say adequately, what has just occurred. Trauma works by shutting
down narrative, or the possibility to adequately explain or describe
fully, exactly at the moment when the trauma occurs. Instead,
trauma survivors often develop broken accounts or covering ration-
alizations that enable them to deal with the excess of emotion and the
wildly unstable situations in which they find themselves at the
ground-zero point. And what they say-even what they believe in
that moment-may be anything but accurate. Therefore, if law is in-
terested in truth, it needs to take into account that reliable accounts
of the participants in traumatic events may be located at some spatial
and temporal remove from the events in question.
All of this is, so far, very abstract. It will take a bit of explaining
to make it more concrete and clear. Let us start by looking at the
suspicion that attends reflection on facts and then at the way that the
ground-zero theory is built into the Federal Rules of Evidence.
I. Reflection upon Facts; Facts upon Reflection
Consider why reflection seems to improve all of the products of
thought, except the statement of facts. If one is making a decision,
the usual advice is that one should reflect on it before committing
oneself, otherwise one can be accused of making a "snap" (read: bad
or at least unstable) decision. If one is trying to arrive at a moral
judgment, consider how much better it is to have evaluated one's po-
sition and all of the alternatives for some time before judging.
Rushing to judgment is not usually considered a good thing. If one
has preferences, better that they should be "considered" preferences,
rather than just the first things that come to mind. Considered pref-
erences are deemed more stable, more enduring, and closer to what
the preferrer actually thinks than those blurted out on the spur of the
moment. Reflection improves decisions, moral judgments and state-
4. The best review of this literature on the effects of trauma can be found in JUDITH
HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY (1992).
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ments about what one wants.
But just the opposite is true when it comes to statements about
facts. If someone asks you, "What happened in the faculty meeting
today?" and you say, "Well, I would like to think it over before
committing myself to a description," you can quickly see that think-
ing before describing is odd. Reflection is not supposed to improve
facts. Instead, reflecting on facts puts the facts that are stated after
such reflection under suspicion. If you have to think about what
happened at school today before you describe it, others can wonder
whether you are fabricating the account, or at least distorting it to
serve certain purposes. We all may be criticized for rushing to judg-
ment, but we are all supposed to "rush to description." In fact, failing
to rush to description is a sign that something is wrong.
Why is this?
Decisions, evaluations and preferences are created in the mind.
In other words, decisions, evaluations and preferences are the results
of mental operations that make sense of the raw materials, that is, of
facts. Perceptions, whether of the outside world or of one's own in-
ner states, are considered on a certain empirical view to be the raw
material processed in these mental operations. They come into the
mind but are not created by the mind, or at least so the empiricist
story goes.' Decisions, evaluations and preferences operate on per-
ceptions that give rise to facts. If perceptions themselves needed to
be decided upon before they could be entered into these other opera-
tions, the distinctions between mental operations and the raw materi-
als on which they operate would be lost. Time can be taken for men-
tal operations, but not for the raw materials that enter these
calculations. The raw materials are supposed to be given, not made.
But psychologists working on the logic of memory have long
since known that memory does not work the way a camera does-re-
cording what happened in a way that can be endlessly reproduced
without change over time.' Memory instead is updated, adjusted to
account for information learned since an event took place. Thus, ex-
periments show that subjects "recall" seeing something that they
could not possibly have seen on the day in question. Subjects recall
such things after they have had intervening information that fills in
their previous lack of knowledge. Thus, subjects in experiments of-
ten show that their memories can in fact be predictably altered by the
introduction of new information, and they unproblematically (even
unconsciously) take into account the new information as if it were
5. This view is most famously attributed to DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888).
6. The literature on memory and its relationship to eyewitnesses testimony has
been summarized by ELIZABETH LOFTUS, EYEWrrNESs TESTIMONY (1979).
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part of the original memory.7
This, of course, is a very good reason to distrust factual accounts
given after there has been some time for reflection, for time adds the
possibility of distortion even if one assumes that reflection does not
itself distort. Memory is alarmingly flexible, while simultaneously
hiding from itself the fact that it was ever different. When one real-
izes also that there may be many reasons to consciously distort an ac-
count of an event once one either has worked out one's interest in the
matter, or has seen the (political or other) importance of certain ver-
sions of events, or has just decided not to be truthful, then this fur-
ther discredits the accounts that are removed in time from the event
under description. Memory can be altered unconsciously, or state-
ments of facts can be consciously changed (through shading the truth
or just plain lying). Descriptions repeated at some distance from an
event, then, come with good reasons to distrust them.
From this viewpoint, it is reasonable to believe that the distribu-
tion of accurate knowledge after an event is quite patterned. The
most accurate descriptions should be given in the moment when an
event is occurring, preferably at the time that the eyewitness is
watching the event, preferably with an eyewitness who is as close as
possible with the best possible view of the event. This is the ground-
7. In my evidence class each year, I conduct the following experiment: One class is
interrupted by an unfamiliar person who is lost, looking for something or bringing a mes-
sage. A scripted dialogue takes place between me and the interrupter, and then the inter-
rupter leaves. About 15 minutes after the interruption, I ask the class to write down a
description of the person who previously entered the room. As one might expect from
the literature on eyewitness testimony, the descriptions are wildly different. In one run of
this experiment, estimates of the height of the male stranger ranged from 5' to over 6' and
his dress ranged from yellow dress shirt and navy sports coat to red flannel shirt with
jeans. The students were all describing the same person that they had equal opportunity
to see. But then I have the stranger return the day after the first interruption, wearing
something different, changing his hairstyle, looking quite altered in appearance. I then
have the stranger introduce himself by name, explain something about his background,
give his height and weight. Students often laugh when they see the gap between their de-
scriptions and the person who showed up on the second day. The day after that (by now.
the third day), I ask the students to recall their memories of the first day, telling them ex-
plicitly that they are not to take into account the information they heard on the second
day. In other words, they are to remember only what they saw and heard on the day of
the initial interruption without allowing in their new knowledge gained on the intervening
day. A great many students-and these are law students with demonstrably good memo-
ries-cannot recall the first day's events without letting in information gleaned on the
second day, even when they know that this danger exists and they are trying not to do it.
And those who do find that they can recall the information from the first day relatively
accurately often say that they were able to do so because they recalled what they wrote in
their descriptions and not the underlying events. They remember writing down that the
interrupter had a mustache and an accent but then cannot recall how they knew that.
This experiment should give some pause to those who believe in the power of memory to
hold events accurately over time.
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zero point I mentioned earlier-the witness who is present at the
moment when an event takes place simultaneously, or very nearly
simultaneously, narrating the event to those who must determine
what happened in that moment. As knowledge moves out from this
ideal point-out in time to days or weeks or months or years after-
wards, or out in space, from feet to yards to blocks away from the
event-knowledge declines in accuracy. This is exactly the ground-
zero theory-that the best knowledge exists at the time of the event
itself in the immediate recollection of the people closest to the event.
Knowledge then becomes less accurate and more unreliable as one
gains distance from the moment in question. As with the effects of a
bomb, knowledge is more intense and accurate at the ground-zero
point, and becomes less concentrated and reliable as one moves
away.
Reflection on descriptions is, then, considered to be a marker of
unreliability while reflection on decisions, judgments and preferences
is considered to be a necessary condition of their reliability. This
leads us to the conclusion that descriptions of events, on this view,
should be most reliable when produced at ground zero itself.
H. The Ground-Zero Theory and the Rules of Evidence
This ground-zero theory is reflected in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. While, of course, other ideas are present in the rules as well, a
great many of the core provisions about relevance and reliability can
be understood by showing that they ensure the enforcement of the
ground-zero theory.
Take, for example, the personal knowledge requirement of Rule
602, probably the most important criterion for determining who may
be a witness in a proceeding under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Rules. It is phrased as an absolute ban: "a witness may not testify to a
matter" unless it can be demonstrated that s/he has "personal knowl-
edge of the matter."8 What is personal knowledge? Generally, it is
interpreted as requiring that the witness have sensory perception of
the facts about which she is testifying, sensory perception which could
only be acquired in the moment that the fact at issue is directly ap-
parent in the world.9 In other words, the witness has to be present at
the ground zero of the fact to which she testifies-that the green car
ran the red light or the suspect was observed running from the scene
of the crime. Second-hand or after-the-fact knowledge is not al-
8. FED. R. EVID. 602 (emphasis added).
9. See FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee's note ("[A] witness who testifies to a
fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an opportunity to observe, and
must have actually observed the fact" in question.).
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lowed.'"
While Rule 602 leads us to the idea that witnesses must have
some relationship to ground zero (that they were within direct sen-
sory perception of it), it does not necessarily say anything about
privileging statements made at ground zero relative to statements
made at other times, as our ground-zero theory would require. What
we should be looking for is the privileging of statements made as
close in time as possible to the time of the event in question to allow
for "description without reflection." Getting close in time like this is
accomplished through a series of broadly interpreted exceptions to
the hearsay framework of Rules 801-804. While the general prohibi-
tion against hearsay is of course shot full of holes, some of the major
openings come around the area of statements made contemporane-
ously with the events.
The rules exempting present-sense impressions," excited utter-
ances 2 and statements about then-existing mental, emotional, or
physical conditions'3 can be justified in light of the fact that they pro-
tect ground-zero statements-statements made at the time of the un-
derlying event being described. In fact, the bar on the use of Rule
803(3) to include current memories that reach back to previous
events confirms that the purpose of the exception is to encourage de-
scription without reflection. Such hearsay exceptions have the ef-
fect of saying that the hearsay framework should not be interpreted
as excluding from introduction at trial utterances made at the same
10. How can we reconcile this insistence on personal knowledge with expert testi-
mony? Such testimony can be admitted, even though experts are almost by definition
witnesses who are not present at the time of the events in direct question in the lawsuit.
What, then, are they witnesses to? They have their "personal knowledge" of other bodies
of knowledge to shed light on the matter at hand. They are witnesses to the processes of
knowledge production, but not necessarily witnesses to any matter in factual dispute in
the concrete case. Of course, some experts are experts precisely by observing through
their senses countless events of a similar sort (e.g. dislocated shoulders, sharp axle breaks.
forged signatures). But others are experts by virtue of book-learning or through other
distancing tools of science. The admission of this kind of expert testimony shows a kind
of stress fracture in the law of evidence. Rule 602 requires personal knowledge that
authoritative commentators want to equate with sensory perception while Rule 702 and
703 allow experts who have special knowledge which may or may not have come through
direct sensory perception of the world, unless you count sensory perception of words on
pages in books or of computer printouts or other tools of science in the production of
knowledge. See FED. R. EVID. 602, 702-703. Expert testimony is one place to imagine
that the ground-zero theory is already not an adequate description of the testimony that is
actually allowed. But much of the admissibility of expert testimony can be recast by say-
ing that experts have personal (i.e. sensory) knowledge of something.
11. SeeFED. R. EvID. 803(1).
12. See FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
13. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3)
14. See FED. R. EvID. 803(3) advisory committee's note.
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time that the observation or sensation is being perceived. These
statements are descriptions constructed at the time of the sensory
perception--"description without reflection" par excellence. As
hearsay exceptions, such statements can be introduced to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, and as such are privileged in a way for
the exact reasons that hearsay is normally excluded. These state-
ments cannot be cross-examined in the moment of their utterance,
nor can the demeanor of the speaker be observed at the same time as
the statements are originally made. Contemporaneous statements sit
beyond the reach of the ordinary trial tactics that undermine state-
ments made in court. While, of course, these out-of-court contempo-
raneous statements still can be attacked, these utterances have a cer-
tain facticity about them, a certain weight because they are factual
descriptions made when there has been no time for the tricks of
memory or the insertion of revisions based on self-interest. They are
the best possible sort of statement, if you believe in the ground-zero
theory.
Recorded recollections, as contemplated by Rule 803(5), admit
out-of-court statements made closer in time to when the underlying
events happened than a description produced in court at the time of
the trial. And the rule admits such recorded recollections as tending
to show the truth of what they state, if the witness cannot remember
the events in the description. Here again, these prior statements
have added credibility because they are made closer in time and
space to the ground-zero moment. Of course, to invoke the recorded
recollections exception, a witness has to fail to have a present recol-
lection of the underlying events, so one might reasonably say that this
rule imagines that recorded recollections are second-best evidence.
It would be better if the witness testifying in court had a clear recol-
lection. But given that notes may be used to "refresh" the memory of
a witness at trial at any point in testimony and the witness can testify
thus refreshed without hearsay problems, it is clear that such previ-
ously recorded descriptions are thought more likely to be accurate
than a later recollection. Witnesses may be encouraged to use such
notes as long as they actually "refresh" and are not relied upon en-
tirely to provide the basis of a new memory.
In general, prior inconsistent statements of witnesses may be
brought in to the trial, either under the strict restrictions of Rule
801(d)(1)(A) for their hearsay uses or more generally under an
analysis of the prior statement as a non-hearsay impeachment use.
The latter guarantees that virtually all stories of witnesses that
change over time will be called to the attention of fact-finders at trial.
Generally, the assumption is that such changing stories should be dis-
counted or even dismissed as fabrications. A witness who changes
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her story over time appears unbelievable.
This discussion of the Federal Rules of Evidence as supporting a
ground-zero theory might be dismissed by arguing that all I have
really said here is that evidence must be relevant, not that the
ground-zero theory of evidence in particular must be true. Why
should statements made at or near the time of the trouble be ex-
cluded when they are our best evidence of what the participants in
the event were thinking? Fair enough, but one needs to probe be-
hind the idea of relevance to see the importance of its use in this way.
Relevant evidence is defined as any evidence that tends to make
the existence of a particular fact at issue more or less likely." Evi-
dence will be deemed relevant if it appears to change the probability
that some alleged fact is more or less true. What affects these prob-
abilities depends not only on scientific judgments about probabilities,
but also on common sense about what things go together in the
world. Relevance does not require a scientific test, but rather, can
rest on obvious or commonsense principles. If people believe that
the presence of smoke indicates that there is a fire, then smoke will
be relevant on the question of whether a fire was burning. But if
people do not believe that music soothes the savage beast, then evi-
dence of the sound of music will be irrelevant to determining whether
the owner of a lion was taking due care when the lion mauled the
neighbor's child. Relevance is meant to be a low standard-if any
change in probability can be shown, then the proffered evidence
meets the relevance test. Nonetheless, if widespread social preju-
dices against the influence of x on y exist, then x will be inadmissible
for proving y. Relevance, in other words, is itself a socially embed-
ded and practiced standard.
What I have argued so far is that the Federal Rules of Evidence
show a strong preference for acquiring information as close in time
and space to the events in issue as possible. This does not mean that
all other information is excluded. Certainly not. It means, however,
that whatever is said and done at the time of the trouble will always
have a place in the evidence that must be considered.
III. Trauma and Narrative
My work on trauma and narrative goes back 20 years to the time
when, as a graduate student, I worked on a study of rape victims and
rape avoiders. In this study, with interviews conducted in the mid-
15. See FED. R. EvID. 401.
16. The principal investigator on the study was Pauline Bart. Some work that grew
out of this study was published in Kim Lane Scheppele and Pauline Bart, Through
Women's Eyes: Defining Danger in the Wake of Sexual Assault, 39 J. SOC. ISSUES 63
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1970s, women were asked during a life-history interview to tell the
story of the sexually violent event(s) that had happened to them. The
differences in the women's stories were striking. The physical events
that happened were not different (these, in fact, were depressingly
similar), but the methods of narration used to describe what had
happened varied quite widely. Some rape victims had terribly disor-
ganized stories, while others had perfectly ordered narratives. Some
stories had clear plots, described appropriate reactions, and pre-
sented what would have been orderly evidence, while other stories
stopped and started, associated apparently unrelated events and fears
with the attack(s) the women had experienced, and generally showed
little narrative coherence. Some of the stories themselves, in other
words, seemed to have been the victims of events.
What we found in our study has been found among other survi-
vors of particularly traumatic events." In fact, a symptom of trauma
is that "[t]he survivor's initial account of the event may be repeti-
tious, stereotyped, and emotionless... It does not develop or prog-
ress in time, and it does not reveal the storyteller's feelings or inter-
pretations of events."' 9  Survivors of traumatic events-and this
includes Holocaust survivors, political prisoners, disaster victims,
crime victims and women who have been held through violence in a
sort of "domestic captivity"2° -have trouble narrating what has hap-
pened to them, especially at first. They engage in self-blame,2' mini-
mize what has happened, or simply fail to remember' or say' what
has happened.
Psychoanalytic theorists have long associated narrative disor-
ganization, minimization and omission with trauma. Freud believed,
for example, that traumatic events were repressed, that is, pushed
down into the level of the unconscious where the subject who experi-
enced the trauma could not consciously remember what actually had
(1983) and in Kim Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095
(1987) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: How THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES
WOMEN WHO SAY No (1987)).
17. For various examples, see generally Scheppele and Bart, supra note 16.
18. See generally HERMAN, supra note 4 (reviewing the evidence of survivors of
traumatic events).
19. Id. at 175.
20. See id. at 74.
21. See Scheppele and Bart, supra note 16, at 79.
22. Many rape victims suffer from short-term memory loss. See generally Lois G.
Veronen et al., Treating Fear and Anxiety in Rape Victims: Implications for the Criminal
Justice System, in PERSPECTIVES ON VICrIMOLOGY 148 (William H. Parsonage ed.,
1979).
23. For evidence that shows that rape in particular is a very underreported crime, see
Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits and
the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 123, 126 n.13 (1992).
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occurred. 2' The Freudian and then Lacanian idea of repression or
foreclosure was defined primarily as a disorder in the symbolic realm,
with either the forgetting of an event or disassociation of a symbol
with the thing that it was supposed to represent as one of the primary
symptoms of trauma." In other words, the inability to come up with
a description or account of some event was a sign that a traumatic
event had occurred. Julia Kristeva observed, following Freud, that
sometimes the memory of a traumatic event is not repressed or for-
gotten, but instead it is recalled and deprived of any emotional
power-it seems completely unimportant.2 The most shocking
events, then, would be described as if they were the most normal in
the world, which would then make it appear as though "nothing hap-
pened."
Either way, whether the underlying trauma is forgotten or
downplayed by being immediately normalized, the narratives of peo-
ple who have been traumatized will be exactly the opposite of what
the law requires: these will not be orderly narratives stating "just the
facts" of a traumatic event as if recorded by a videocamera. Instead,
it will be a sign of the trauma itself that such narratives will be inade-
quate and even inaccurate. Theories of trauma tell us that the worst
time to get information about "what happened" at the moment of
trouble is exactly at the moment of trouble itself from those to whom
the trouble has happened. And yet, the ground-zero theory of evi-
dence tends to push evidence-seekers to look exactly there for an-
swers.
IV. What Is To Be Done?
While it is commonsensical in many ways and even adequate for
dealing with nontraumatic events, the ground-zero theory of evidence
does not take into account a body of scientific research on the effects
24. How had it come about that the patients had forgotten so many of the facts of
their external and internal lives, but could nevertheless recollect them if a par-
ticular technique was applied? Observation supplied an exhaustive answer to
these questions. Everything that had been forgotten had in some way or other
been distressing: it had been either alarming or painful or shameful by the stan-
dards of the subject's personality. It was impossible not to conclude that that was
precisely why it had been forgotten-that is, why it had not remained conscious.
... It was only necessary to translate into words what I myself had observed, and
I was in possession of a theory of repression.
Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical Study, in THE FREUD READER 3, 17-18 (Peter Gay
ed., 1995).
25. For a very compact history of the psychoanalytic idea of repression. see
ELISABETH ROUDINESCO, JACQUES LACAN 281-283 (Barbara Bray trans., 1997).
26. See JULIA KRISTEVA, NEW MALADIES OF THE SOUL 47 (Ross Guberman trans.,
1995).
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of trauma on the organization of descriptions. Insofar as the law at-
tributes causation and blame to traumatic events, those who are
traumatized will not make the best witnesses right after they have
been traumatized. Instead, they will be exactly the witnesses whose
statements at the scene of the event-at the ground-zero point-will
be least helpful and least revelatory of "what happened."
The inadequacy of such witnesses surfaces most often in Ameri-
can evidence law when the earlier statements are contradicted or
modified through later statements made at trial. Statements made
close in time to the events are either introduced as contemporaneous
statements tending to show the truth of what they state precisely be-
cause they are contemporaneous (casting doubt on later accounts) or
they are introduced to impeach the statements that a witness makes
later, when her mind is clearer, when the trauma has started to heal,
or when the context has been reestablished against which to judge the
events that occurred and when elements or emotions around the
story change.' Either way, the inference a fact-finder is encouraged
to draw is that the witness whose account changes is unstable, which
means that the witness should now be distrusted, in part or in full.
But as we have seen, a witness who has started to recover from
trauma can be expected to have a somewhat different account of
events than she did when suffering from the effects of trauma. In-
stead of being used as a sign of new possibilities of truthfulness, any
change in stories can be used to show that nothing the witness says
should be believed.
The ground-zero theory rests on a conception about truth that
requires modification. The idea about truth embedded in the theory
is precisely that description without reflection is possible, and that
one can find a somehow untainted or "raw" description that then gets
tainted or "cooked" in subsequent retellings. The theory holds out
the possibility that there is a version of events that has no "spin"-an
account of "what happened" that is the simple and unvarnished truth.
Distortions sneak in later when the witness figures out what is in her
interest to say.
The ground-zero theory assumes that while later events have a
"spin" attached to them, the first version does not. But as Ludwig
Wittgenstein reiterated perhaps most powerfully, seeing is never pure
in the first place, but is always "seeing as."' In other words, the first
version of events also has a perspective embedded in it, like with any
27. See generally Scheppele, supra note 23.
28. See LUDWIG WiITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 194-195
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1984), in which Wittgenstein provides the famous ac-
count of the duck-rabbit in which the image portrayed in the picture shifts depending on
one's perspective.
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other version of events. The perspective embedded in the first things
people say when traumatized are those produced either by the
trauma itself (downplaying or forgetting the most traumatic details)
or by the most unthinking frameworks people have for interpreting
the world (stereotyped, repetitive, undeveloped accounts). For ex-
ample, if a trauma victim has come to see the horrible events that
have occurred to her or him as natural, then she might tell listeners
stories that put herself rightly in the role of the victim. This is why it
is not surprising to find stories of self-hating Jewish victims of the
Holocaust or self-blaming victims of domestic violence. 29 The trauma
presents itself as naturalized or minimized. And the story repeats the
trauma in this inverted way.
Why should the law privilege the most stereotyped or colonized
framework that a trauma victim presents-which is what the first
story tends to be? Why should the accounts given in the moment
when the trouble occurred have such special power and force? If the
studies about the effects of trauma are correct, then the law of evi-
dence has it exactly backwards. Much more sympathy and belief
should be placed in the later stories, even when they contradict what
the victims said at ground-zero.
29. See generally HERMAN, supra note 4.
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